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Abstract 
The possible applicability of business process reengineering (BPR) to 
organisations in the public sector is explored through analysis of the central 
issues in BPR and the emerging experience of organisations which have 
recently implemented it. In particular, the paper suggests that success of 
reengineering may depend critically on the strategic apability of the 
organisation prior to undertaking the effort. For that reason well-performing 
organisations are more likely to improve performance by means of BPR than 
are weak ones. Yet, in the public sector, it tends to be badly performing 
agencies which are most encouraged to undertake BPR. Knowing and 
understanding the reasons for success or failure of BPR in private 
organisations can prepare public sector managers for undertaking the effort, 
but each reengineering initiative must be tailored to the specific needs and 
circumstances of the individual agency. Public sector managers hould use 
the widest possible definition of 'value' when analysing value-added in
process reengineering and should be especially sensitive to the way in which 
'value' in the public sector is differently interpreted by major stakeholders. 
During this learning process, public sector agencies would be well advised to 
be conservative in estimating ains from BPR. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Business process reengineering (BPR) has been one 
of the key fads in business management in the last 
three years. It has been explicitly promoted by its 
inventors as a revolution in business thought - -  it 
seems that now 'revolution' is no longer being 
preached by the USSR, it has been taken up by US 
management consultants. 
BPR can be summed up as follows: 
(a) organisations must exploit all technologies avail- 
able, particularly recent developments in infor- 
mation technology; and 
(b) the process which organisations use to arrive at 
the product or service they provide to customers 
must be radically redesigned in the light of the 
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organisation's current environment rather than 
its traditions. 
Thus BPR is about breaking off from and doing away 
with past administrative traditions when marginal 
adjustments topast practices do not seem to help the 
organisation in dealing with its current situation 
(Hyde, 1994). 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possible 
applicability of BPR to organisations in the public 
sector, through analysis of the central issues involved 
in reengineering business processes and a review of 
emerging experience in organisations which have 
implemented BPR - -  these have been primarily in the 
private sector. In particular, the paper suggests that 
the success of a reengineering effort may depend criti- 
cally on the strategic apability of the organisation 
prior to undertaking the effort. 
2. WHAT IS BPR AND WHAT DOES IT iMPLY?, 
Hammer and Champy (1993, p. 32), the early pro- 
ponents of the BPR concept, define reengineering as: 
"the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of 
business processes to achieve dramatic improvements 
in critical, contemporary measures of performance, 
such as cost, quality, service, and speed". However, 
they are a little coy in coming up with a more precise 
definition. On the basis of their work and subsequent 
writings by others, it is possible to identify the follow- 
ing elements as important components of the concept 
of BPR. 
• A complete challenge to the existing situation. Why 
is the process in place? Is it really needed? Does 
it add value? Could other processes, or the appli- 
cation of better information technology, get the 
same results as the process in question? 
• Radical redesign. Reinventing the core processes 
needed in the organisation and breaking away from 
all past approaches, rather than making do with 
incremental nd marginal changes. 
• Drastic improvement. New processes hould have 
the potential to improve performance by moving 
the organisation from one performance urve to a 
higher one. 
• Alignment with corporate strategy. Changes hould 
be wholly consistent with corporate strategy - -  but 
only after a re-examination f the mission and a 
redefinition of where the organisation would like 
to see itself in the foreseeable future, so that the 
vagueness and ambiguity which are common in 
published strategies have been eliminated. 
• Value enhancement. Creating value where none 
existed before, or increasing the value to meet (or 
exceed) that of the best altemative products and 
services anywhere. 
Clearly these are highly ambitious claims to make 
for any management technique. What weapons are at 
hand? Why should this management technique make 
a difference, when so many others have proven inad- 
equate to break through the inertia which suffuses 
most organisations? And, above all, how could such 
claims be substantiated in the public sector? 
One reason for the ambition of the claims is that 
BPR aims to put rationality and systematic thought 
back into management transformation efforts, rather 
than relying on vaguer notions of inspirational leader- 
ship and culture change. Key elements of reengineer- 
ing are analysis and inductive reasoning. The two 
intertwine at each stage of the BPR effort: 
• they contribute, in the first stage of the preliminary 
BPR effort, to a better understanding of the issues 
and problems the organisation needs to address; 
• in the second stage, analysis and inductive reason- 
ing are used to explore the theoretical capabilities 
of the organisation, i  terms of how well it is likely 
to be able to address its identified problems. In 
other words, a model is developed of organisational 
structure and administrative (work) practices that 
would allow effective and efficient attainment of 
goals and would help the organisation todeal with 
the issues that influence customer satisfaction; 
• in the third stage of the BPR effort, the gap 
between institutional capabilities and the issues the 
organisation must address is defined: 
• the fourth stage of a BPR initiative involves unin- 
hibited problem solving efforts which assume no 
prior constraints on the direction or the nature of 
the solution to the problem, i.e. the generation of 
imaginative and creative ways of dealing with the 
identified gap. 
These stages constitute a modem reformulation f the 
technique of function-cost analysis, traditionally used 
in value engineering (Bovaird, 1976). They require 
the specification of the core functions of the organis- 
ation, not just the activities carried out, in relation to 
each service provided. They also require the ability 
to allocate costs of all activities between these func- 
tions - -  a step beyond activity-based costing. 
Although this cost allocation procedure only needs to 
be done in a rough-and-ready way, and certainly does 
not require precise accounting information, it cur- 
rently poses a rather daunting challenge to most pub- 
lic sector organisations (and many private sector 
firms). 
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The strategic thinking needed in this rational 
approach implies separation of those components of 
each identified business process that produce 'value 
added' from those that do not seem to add any value 
(Manganelli and Klein, 1994). The idea is to eliminate 
all those steps in the business process, or even a 
whole sub-process, which are not necessary to sustain 
or facilitate value-adding functions. Reengineering 
suggests that the only functions that are of strategic 
importance to the organisation are those that add 
value. Effective reengineering projects are always 
focused on strategic processes, defined in this way. 
Possible solutions may emerge in the BPR effort 
as a result of: 
(a) identifying and developing alternative options for 
filling the gap between institutional capabilities 
and the issues the organisation must address 
('putting the problem right'); 
(b) devising methods for circumventing or bridging 
the gap ( 'making the problem seem 
unimportant'); or 
(c) redefining the mission of the organisation (and 
thus the set of issues it must address) or its chosen 
environment (e.g. turning a local operation into 
a regional/national/international operation or the 
other way around) ('making the problem 
irrelevant'). 
The search down each of these pathways towards a 
solution is likely to include a close examination of 
the possible benefits from a greater eliance on infor- 
mation technology, which is a central theme in most 
BPR writing (Champy, 1995; Davenport and Short, 
1990; Halachmi, 1995a; Hammer and Champy, 1993; 
Hyde, 1994). However, this focus on IT solutions is 
not the essence of the analysis involved in BPR. Each 
business process has to be reconceptualised from 
basic principles. Indeed, the rethinking may need to 
be even more radical than that: Drucker (1990) has 
suggested that major productivity breakthroughs in
services come not from speeding up or automating 
the task, as is generally the case in manufacturing, 
but from redefining the task. 
Moreover, BPR provides an alternative perspective 
on ways of incorporating quality assurance pro- 
cedures into business processes. Much attention has 
been given to the fact that in BPR the critical re- 
examination of all existing processes allows the elim- 
ination of unnecessary steps and procedures. How- 
ever, it is at least equally important that this 
rebuilding of business processes simultaneously 
allows the design of a quality management system 
which ensures that: 
• consideration of quality issues is built into each 
stage of the service planning and delivery process; 
• the entire set of activities that add value to a family 
of products or services is welded into a coherent 
and continuous 'value stream' (Womack and 
Jones, 1994); 
• the coherence of this continuous value stream is 
achieved not just for a single organisation's activi- 
ties but also for those of its suppliers, distributors 
and customers in the supply chain (Harvey et al., 
1993). 
The consequence of BPR, carried out in this way, 
should be that quality problems are less likely to 
occur and, if they do occur, are more likely to be 
identified early and dealt with appropriately. 
3. ARE PROCESS REENGINEERING AND VALUE 
REENGINEERING RELEVANT TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR?. 
The desire to improve the efficiency of administrat- 
ive and service delivery processes in the public sector 
is no different from that in the private sector, and the 
use of productivity enhancement techniques has a 
long history in the public sector. The application of 
BPR in the manufacturing realm has, in any case, 
inevitably involved major consideration of process 
redesign for services, since so much of the activity in 
any manufacturing company is provision of internal 
services. However, some of the characteristics of the 
BPR effort outlined in the previous section fit less 
well within a public sector organisational culture than 
within a private culture: 
• 'value added' by specific processes in the public 
sector cannot be reduced to a single dimension as 
it sometimes can in private firms, where a 'bottom 
line' contribution to profit may be appropriate 
(although this is also unlikely to be easy in many 
private sector services); 
• objective setting in the public sector is often sym- 
bolic rather than analytical, making it difficult to 
identify gaps between aspirations and performance; 
• costing systems are often rigid and traditional in 
the public sector, so that function--cost analysis can 
only be done informally and by guesstimate (and 
will therefore be disowned by finance staff in the 
organisation); 
• 'uninhibited problem solving' is particularly 
unlikely in services with a large professional base, 
since the power of many stakeholders is only main- 
tained by closely shackling the 'problem solving' 
activities of other professionals ormanagers - - this 
also applies, of course, to some private sector ser- 
vices; 
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• 'uninhibited problem solving' is also usually 
shackled in public sector organisations by the 
daunting set of regulatory and legislative con- 
straints which they face from higher levels of 
government and by the insistence on 'hands-on' 
intervention i  micro-management issues by their 
own elected governing bodies; 
• processes identified as 'problematic' may be 
'owned' by some stakeholders who are quite unin- 
terested in any potential gain from process reengin- 
eering - -  this is again a hallmark of pro- 
fessionalised services and of highly unionised 
organisations, both of which are characteristic of 
the public sector. 
The first critical difference between the introduc- 
tion of BPR in the public and in the private sector is 
conceptualisation f value creation. In the private sec- 
tor it is easier to reengineer the business process 
because it is easier to define what is meant by 'value' 
and which organisational functions or administrative 
processes contribute to it. In the public sector, how- 
ever, it is not easy to define 'value' or 'quality' 
(Halachmi, 1995a; Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1995; 
Walsh, 1991). 
Value in the public sector is certainly not the price 
of the service (many public services are exchanged at 
zero price to clients in high need), nor is it the cost 
of the inputs (although this is how the value of the 
public sector services is accounted for in the national 
income accounts). If we accept he view that 'value' 
is what is considered to be value by the stakeholder, 
i.e. what brings satisfaction to the stakeholder, then 
we are faced with the reality that value in the public 
sector must be multi-faceted and must encompass 
elements never to be found in private sector value 
analysis. On top of the use value experienced by the 
service end-users, we must add: 
• 'spillover value' added - -  the value experienced 
by indirect service users; 
• social value added - -  as a result of support for 
social cohesion policies or social justice inter- 
ventions; 
• political value added by virtue of the support for 
and enhancement of democratic processes (often 
more through the way the service planning and 
delivery are managed than through the content of 
the service itself). 
Each of these value added calculations is not only 
difficult in itself, but also involves a different mix of 
stakeholders, each with their own perceptions. Man- 
aging the assessment of value added in process reen- 
gineering cannot herefore be simply a technical exer- 
cise in the public sector, it must always constitute a
political debate. 
Furthermore, ven when a definition of 'value' has 
been agreed in the public sector, organisational func- 
tions and procedures that do not add to value when 
performed in the private sector may have an inherent 
legal or symbolic value in the public sector; for 
example, the concept of due process or the consistent 
application of decision rules. While in the private sec- 
tor the only objects of consumption which are recog- 
nised as important by the dominant stakeholders are, 
in most cases, the outputs or the outcomes of a ser- 
vice, in the public sector some key stakeholders 
essentially derive their value from consumption of the 
processes (e.g. the groups representing women and 
black employees who wish to ensure equal opport- 
unities at work in public organisations) or the inputs 
(e.g. professional ssociations which wish to maintain 
requirements for professional accreditation or quali- 
fications in certain processes). 
The difference is even more evident in the subtle 
change in terminology from 'reengineering' to 'reen- 
gineering for value' (Wreden, 1995). According to 
Wreden, reengineering for value involves, among 
other things, the dumping of marginal clients in order 
that the organisation is able to provide the main body 
of its clientele with better value. However, public 
agencies are not likely to be able to take this route, 
even if they so wished. Indeed, the recent attempts 
by some privatised agencies in the UK to dump 
unwanted customers in this fashion has led to a public 
outcry and a tightening of the public service obli- 
gation in the regulatory framework. This is, of course, 
one of the central reasons why government cannot 
simply be run like a private business. 
4. THE 'BPR CAPACITY' OF THE ORGANISA'I]OH 
The promises of BPR attracted the attention of 
private sector managers as they tried to deal with glo- 
bal competition and ever higher customer expec- 
tations in respect of service, quality and value. How- 
ever, only a few organisations to date can report 
success tories and achievement of dramatic improve- 
ments in performance after reengineering their busi- 
ness process - and even fewer can make these claims 
as a result of their first attempts (Caldwell, 1994; 
Champy, 1995; Hall et al., 1993). This does not seem 
to be because of any deficiency in the technical ability 
to carry out process analysis and to devise potential 
process improvements. Organisations generally report 
an enormous backlog of process improvements ident- 
ified in BPR. What other factors are therefore neces- 
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sary for organisations to succeed in reengineering? 
What do organisations that are successful in their 
BPR efforts have that others do not? Examining the 
answers to these questions is critical for any organis- 
ation contemplating BPR in either the public or the 
private sector. 
A key factor influencing the results of a BPR 
initiative is the 'BPR capacity' - -  the ability of an 
organisation to undertake and survive such a radical 
initiative. We suggest hat there are three elements 
of this BPR capacity, the presence of each of which 
constitutes a necessary condition for success in carry- 
ing out BPR. The first element is a proper understand- 
ing of the requirements and implications of the BPR 
process. A second element is the ability to oper- 
ationalise and implement the results of a BPR analy- 
sis. Finally, there is a need for a shared willingness 
to face the cultural challenge to the organisation 
which is posed by BPR - -  this is considered in a 
later section. 
First, organisations eed a proper understanding of 
the requirements and implications of the BPR pro- 
cess - -  what the reengineering process is all about, 
as well as what it is not. For example, those involved 
in the reengineering effort must realise upfront that 
the changes resulting from the reengineering effort 
will not be achieved through a succession of marginal 
changes; they are intended to be transformational, not 
incremental. They will therefore involve significant 
pain to some stakeholders. The move from one per- 
formance curve to a higher one and the beginning of 
a new high-performance era involves what physicists 
term a 'big bang'. 
In this insistence on rapid and radical change, BPR 
takes an extreme position along the spectrum of view- 
points on the appropriate pace of change in the cor- 
porate transformation process (Bovaird and Hughes, 
1995). In recent years, much has been written about 
the relative merits of innovation, which involves a 
discontinuity with the past, as compared to continuous 
improvement, particularly in its Japanese guise of 
'kaizen'. Some authors refuse to take sides in this 
debate: Peter Drucker, for example, has suggested that 
it is possible to trigger successful organisational 
change from any position on this spectrum, from con- 
tinuous improvement through managed evolution to 
out-and-out innovation (Drucker, 1990). 
Hammer and Champy (1993) are highly specific 
about the requisite rate of change. They insist that 
change through reengineering must be fundamental, 
radical and dramatic, an all-or-nothing proposition 
that cannot be carried out in small steps. Moreover, 
at the end of the book they suggest that reengineeer- 
ing should be done quickly (within twelve months 
from start of process to first implementation) and not 
be dragged out. Indeed, Hammer and Champy 
specifically rule out the 'kaizen' approach, since reen- 
gineering seeks breakthroughs, not steady incremental 
improvement (p. 49). There are significant differences 
between the public and the private sector when it 
comes to the applicability of this analysis. The insist- 
ence of Hammer and Champy on radical transform- 
ations within a period of twelve months is over-opti- 
mistic in the typical public sector context, where 
many stakeholders, both internal and external, can and 
usually do exercise restraining influences on the pace 
of change. Only if BPR can be implemented ata more 
leisurely pace is it likely to be relevant to the circum- 
stances of public agencies. 
The second condition for increasing the chance of 
success in BPR is that organisations eed to have the 
ability to operationalise and implement the results of 
a BPR analysis; i.e., they need to be able to absorb 
into the everyday routines of organisational ctivity 
the conceptual framework which emerges from a 
BPR, depicting the preferable way for that organis- 
ation to do its business in the future. This has to be 
done consistently throughout the organisation, so that 
separate Strategic Business Units (SBUs) do not 
approach BPR and its implementation i  contradic- 
tory ways. As Veasey (1994) has shown in the case 
of large diversified businesses such as Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office (HMSO) in the UK public sector, 
there can be a tendency for major change processes 
to undermine rather than enhance synergy. BPR must 
be part of an overall corporate approach which 
ensures that redesign of corporate processes is fully 
coordinated with that of SBU processes. 
This second prerequisite of a successful BPR is 
closely related to the 'health' of the organisation 
before it undergoes the drastic treatment of reengin- 
eering. To use an analogy, a very sick person is less 
likely to survive a heart transplant. Thus, organis- 
ations at the peak of their performance are more likely 
to be able to move to a higher performance curve 
through a reengineering effort. Poorly performing 
organisations start off with intrinsic weaknesses - -  
perhaps arising from lack of talent, resources or stake- 
holder support - -  and are therefore less likely to come 
up with the right ideas, the right people to carry them 
out or sufficient resources for underwriting the neces- 
sary reengineering effort. 
In the private sector, excellent companies may use 
BPR to become even better, while weaker ones may 
take their chances at being born again, accepting that 
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they will die if unsuccessful. This is also true in the 
voluntary sector, where many staff are frustrated by 
current constraints and the built-in operational inef- 
ficiencies - -  they may feel that it is better to try for 
major improvement and to wind up the operation if 
this proves not to be possible. In the public sector, 
in contrast, it may well be that agencies which are 
performing well but which wish to improve their per- 
formance still further may not be permitted or encour- 
aged to undertake a BPR initiative because of poli- 
ticians' belief that "if it ain't broke - -  don't fix it". 
However, weak agencies which are less likely to be 
successful (from the perspective of their dominant 
stakeholders) are more likely to be permitted, or even 
pushed, by their stakeholders to take a chance of 
improving through BPR - -  and are likely to survive 
even after the effort fails. 
5. THE CULTURAL CHALLENGE OF BPR 
The most fundamental issue in relation to BPR 
capacity is, however, whether organisations can gen- 
erate and survive the culture change which BPR 
requires. Hence, we must examine the role of organis- 
ational culture in the introduction of a change such 
as BPR (Tichy, 1983). Organisational culture is com- 
monly referred to as the "values, beliefs, traditions, 
philosophies, rules and heroes shared by all members 
of the organisation" (Gatewood et al., 1995, p. 19). 
BPR requires the organisation to do away with every- 
thing it had in the past, including its previous culture, 
because the old culture is related to (indeed may 
partly be the reason for) the unsuccessful way the 
organisation previously conducted its affairs. Replac- 
ing the existing culture should be one of the stated 
goals of the BPR, a necessary condition for regarding 
the overall set of changes as a success - -  not merely 
an unintended side effect. In other words, the BPR 
plan is a real, not simply a subjectively perceived, 
threat to an important element of the organisation's 
identity. 
This raises the paradoxes that the impetus for 
change has arisen from that same culture, that a strong 
common culture can facilitate the change process, and 
that a change which does not threaten the existing 
organisational culture stands a better chance of 
being successful. 
There are at least two questions to ask here. First, 
is it possible to effect a culture change in one organis- 
ation unless a commensurate change occurs within the 
other organisations on which that organisation 
depends for carrying out its mission? Clearly, the suc- 
cess of a BPR initiative in the case of a bank or an 
insurance agency is not dependent on corresponding 
changes in the organisational culture of the stock 
exchange where they get some of the resources they 
need, the agencies that regulate them or any other 
organisation i  their industry. However, this is often 
not so in the public sector. For example, there may 
be a major dysfunction if the culture of a social care 
department is not synchronised with the culture of its 
local health authority. This is essentially to argue that 
the value chains of public agencies are often more 
closely enmeshed with each other than is the case in 
private sector services (Hewitt and Bovaird, 1996). 
Secondly, could it be that the attempt in BPR to 
replace the organisational culture simultaneously with 
radical reorganisation is itself the reason that BPR is 
not successful most of the time (Champy, 1995; Ham- 
mer and Champy, 1993)? If BPR is to be successful, 
organisational actors at all levels must understand 
more than just the process of using BPR techniques 
to arrive at a better way of conducting the business 
of the organisation. It is just as important hat all 
members of the organisation comply with three con- 
ditions: 
• they must share a common understanding and 
acceptance of the ways the new business process 
will be embodied in activities at the individual and 
unit/subunit levels - -  this requires an organis- 
ational culture which is strong on communication 
and on intra-organisational synergy; 
• they must share a commitment to the new expec- 
tations in respect of productivity, performance 
measures, and performance management practices 
(for individual employees and for their respective 
administrative units); 
• they must share a consensus that it is acceptable to 
absorb the opportunity cost. That is to say, they 
must knowingly and willingly take the risk that if 
the BPR effort fails, after expending a large amount 
of tangible and nontangible resources, there may 
be adverse consequences for them at the individual 
and subunit level. 
This last point relates to the flexibility and adapta- 
bility of the organisation. As Danny Miller (1992) has 
argued strongly, a strong organisational culture can 
easily lead to an organisation's destruction rather than 
its success, unless that strong culture embodies a will- 
ingness and ability to be adaptable - -  it can represent 
a rut rather than a superhighway. Once BPR is 
accepted by the organisation, there is an assumption 
of periodic radical change. The mindset needed to go 
down this road is very different from that typically 
found in bureaucracy, whether in the public or the 
private sector. 
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Preparing the members of any organisation tocope 
with the aftermath of the BPR initiative is a must, and 
it is a formidable task. Doing it right can pre-empt 
some of the causes of low morale which might other- 
wise undermine the success of the BPR effort. All 
those involved in the BPR effort must understand that 
BPR can make a dramatic improvement in individual 
processes without necessarily bringing about immedi- 
ately measurable changes in the overall performance 
of the organisation (Walsh, 1991). Real productivity 
improvement through BPR may come about only 
rather later, when everybody has become genuinely 
involved and is clear about what the organisation is 
trying to do and how it will go about it (Manganelli 
and Klein, 1994; Walker, 1995). This takes even 
longer in the public sector, where professionalism 
often sets departments (and even sections of 
departments) against each other, and where goal clar- 
ity is often missing because of the desire of top man- 
agers and politicians to maintain a certain discreet 
ambiguity about heir fundamental intentions. This is 
further exacerbated in the public sector, where rising 
needs for many services (e.g. because of demographic 
change) mean that objectively measured indicators 
sometimes show a fall in key service outcomes, even 
though the organisation has, at least by all its internal 
criteria, undertaken significant performance-enhanc- 
ing initiatives. 
Given the likelihood of decreasing morale during 
at least he early stages of BPR, due to its implications 
of radical, continuing and disruptive change, it is 
necessary that part of the culture-building process 
under BPR involves inputs from those stakeholders 
whose interests are better served under the new 
regime - -  in particular, service users. Not only is their 
feedback needed in the technical redesign of service 
processes, but their enthusiasm for the perceived 
improvements is a prerequisite oconvincing some of 
the other stakeholders that the uncomfortable changes 
involved are worthwhile. 
6. MANAGING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
STAKEHOLDERS IN A BPR INmATIVE 
The process of radical cultural change has different 
implications for internal and external stakeholders. 
The appropriate involvement of each stakeholder in
the BPR initiative is one of the central tasks for top 
management i  designing the BPR process. 
The intention of BPR to be comprehensive means 
that all internal stakeholders of the organisation must 
play an active rather than a passive role in ongoing 
process design and improvement. This is likely to be 
more problematic n service organisations dominated 
by professionals. Professionals tend to believe they 
have a right to dictate certain ways of working 
because of their exclusive knowledge and accredited 
professional qualifications. They are often very reluc- 
tant to share the responsibility for process design with 
'non-professionals' and are uninterested in fitting in 
with the needs of other staff in the organisation. The 
goal of 'improved efficiency' rarely seems ufficiently 
important to professionals to justify 'tinkering with 
tried and tested professional procedures'. This prob- 
lem is clearly not exclusive to public sector organis- 
ations, but they are much more likely to experience 
it, given their highly professionalised nature. BPR is 
unlikely to work if done to professional staff by other 
staff, rather than done by professionals for themselves 
and others. Bringing a sufficient group of professional 
staff to the point of readiness for a genuine BPR effort 
is both a major skills training challenge and a cultural 
revolution in itself. 
External stakeholders may also pose more block- 
ages to a BPR effort in the public sector than in the 
private sector. While in the case of private organis- 
ations stakeholder analysis can usually identify out- 
side stakeholders whose consent, support or non- 
interference is necessary for the success of BPR, this 
is often more difficult for public agencies, ince exter- 
nal stakeholders are often passive or quiescent until 
triggered by specific events or proposals. Also, in the 
private sector, ownership of any organisational pro- 
cess is likely to be within the organisation whereas 
clients and customers may have an interest only in 
the end results. This may well not be so in the public 
sector, where 'outsiders' may be the legal or de facto 
owners of any given process. When a process is 
'owned' by more than one proprietor (e.g. assess- 
ments for social and health care in the community), 
or when self-anointed 'owners' of a specific process 
have little interest in the end result of the process (e.g. 
those units of a social care agency with an interest in 
providing residential care for the elderly, and those 
interest groups concerned with lobbying for improve- 
ments in the overall quality of life of the elderly), 
opposition to any prospect of change is very likely 
and 'whistleblowers' will be frequent. Some whistle- 
blowers have the additional, even greater power of 
'shroud-waving', which allows the creation of a 
strong blocking alliance between internal and external 
stakeholders, assisted by the media. Since the public 
sector is characterised bya larger number of 'process- 
specific' stakeholders, this suggests that there are 
greater chances to block BPR in the public sector than 
in the private sector. 
In addition, there are often certain minimum stan- 
A. Halachmi and T. Bovaird 
dards of service continuity in the public sector which 
would not fetter a private provider. They may arise 
from expectations or legal rights of external stake- 
holders, or simply from commitments made by the 
agency. Private service providers, in introducing the 
changes arising from BPR, may select a time when 
any interference with the quality of the service may 
be reduced to a minimum, e.g. when most clients are 
on their annual vacation. In many cases private pro- 
viders may arrange with other private providers to 
help out during the transition. In most cases service 
providers in the public sector do not have this option 
(Halachmi, 1995b). Thus, for example, the Disability 
Determination Service of the Social Security Admin- 
istration (SSA) cannot ask its clients to wait with 
their new applications for benefit or to use the ser- 
vices of another provider while the agency upgrades 
its ability to provide services (Halachmi, 1995c). This 
is likely to increase the cost of any BPR effort in the 
public sector. 
On the other hand, in the private sector only mar- 
ginal deteriorations in the quality of service can be 
allowed during the transition period, since major dis- 
ruptions of service may cause clients to seek the ser- 
vice elsewhere, or to give up the service altogether. 
This is not so in the case of many public agencies: 
being a monopoly supplier of essential services, they 
can afford to reduce service quality to just above the 
level that would start a riot. Indeed, the deterioration 
of the service may continue indefinitely, generating 
some of the savings the agency may attribute to the 
success of reengineering. This is unlikely to generate 
support of clients (or professional groups dealing with 
these clients) for such BPR initiatives. 
The above discussion suggests the proposition that, 
because 'ownership' of processes in the private sector 
is internal to the organisation itself, it may be easier to 
get consent o change those processes and to prepare 
members of the organisation for the aftermath of the 
BPR initiative. In the public sector, 'ownership' is not 
only internal but also external: it often lies simul- 
taneously within the agency, within government and 
outside government. Getting consent for change 
involves the building of a winning coalition - -  a task 
that may be too much for most public managers. Pre- 
paring 'process owners' who are outside the agency 
may be seen as requiring too many resources. If this 
causes the agency to cut corners on preparing external 
stakeholders for change, there may be subsequent 
unfortunate r sults in the aftermath of the BPR effort. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
There are major differences between the case of 
reengineering in the public and private sectors, 
especially in respect of the core value generation pro- 
cess which underlies the reengineering effort and in 
the criteria used in deciding whether or not to launch 
a BPR initiative. The success of a reengineering effort 
may depend critically on the strategic apability of 
the organisation prior to undertaking the effort. Well- 
performing organisations, public or private, are more 
likely to survive BPR and to improve performance 
than weak ones. Yet, in the public sector, well-per- 
forming agencies may not be permitted to go through 
BPR, while those that have been subject to recent 
criticism are likely to be encouraged even if the effort 
fails to improve performance. 
While the experience of BPR in the private sector 
is indeed of importance to the learning of managers 
in the public sector, managers in either sector should 
not expect he experiences of others to provide tailor- 
made solutions to their specific problems. Knowing 
and understanding the reasons for success or failure 
of BPR in the private sector can prepare public sector 
managers for undertaking the effort, but it cannot 
automatically indicate to them a preferred model for 
reengineering. 
However, as more accounts of successful - -  and 
unsuccessful - -  cases of reengineering are docu- 
mented, it may be possible to undertake the develop- 
ment of a generic model(s) of reengineering by sector. 
For the present, public sector managers hould pay 
particular attention to the widest possible definition 
of 'value' when analysing value added in the process 
reengineering effort. In doing so, they will need to be 
especially sensitive to the way in which 'value' in the 
public sector is differently interpreted by the major 
stakeholders and the intensity with which stake- 
holders (both internal and external) identify with the 
processes whose radical redesign is intended. In the 
interim, they would be well advised to be conserva- 
tive in estimating the gains from BPR. 
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